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Protection in the United States for 
“Famous Marks”:  The Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act Revisited 
Edward E. Vassallo* 
Maryanne Dickey** 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act,1 known as the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Dilution Act” or “Act”), be-
came effective January 16, 1996.2  The passage of the Act arguably 
represents a high-water mark in the federal recognition of trademark 
rights.3  The Act creates a genuine property right in trademarks 
separate from any consumer confusion or deception.4  The standards 
used to fully analyze a federal dilution claim are just beginning to 
emerge in court decisions. 
To understand trademark dilution, one must first examine 
trademarks and trademark infringement.  A trademark is any word, 
name, symbol, or device employed by a manufacturer or a merchant 
to identify his or her goods and to distinguish them from those of 
 
* Member, Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto.  Columbia University, B.S. 1965, 
M.S. 1967; Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1973. 
** Associate, Fitzpatrick Cella Harper & Scinto.  Boston University, B.A. 1983; 
Fordham University School of Law, J.D. 1988.  This Essay is dedicated to the memory of 
Ms. Dickey. 
1. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999)) [hereinafter Lanham Act]. 
2. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998)). 
3. See Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial 
Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 121, 121 (1996). 
4. See id. 
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another.5  “Trademark infringement occurs when one party adopts a 
trademark which is the same as or is so similar to an existing mark 
that, when it is applied to the second party’s goods, the relevant pur-
chasing public is likely to be confused, mistaken, or deceived as be-
tween the goods themselves.”6 Dilution, by contrast, is the dimin-
ished capacity of a distinctive trademark to identify the source of 
goods bearing that mark.7 
There are five distinct areas that have received the most judi-
cial attention in the area of trademark dilution: (1) the attempted 
retroactive application of the statute; (2) the evidence used to de-
termine whether or not a mark is famous; (3) the factors considered 
to determine dilution by blurring; (4) what use of a mark is exempt 
from the Act; (5) the “commercial use in commerce;”8 and (6) the 
procedural matters to consider when pursuing, or defending 
against, a federal dilution claim.  Conceptually, a defendant’s use 
of a mark can lead to trademark infringement without dilution, it 
can lead to dilution without infringement, or it can result in in-
fringement and dilution.  Trademark infringement without dilution 
occurs when a non-famous trademark is infringed.9  Trademark di-
lution without infringement occurs when plaintiff’s mark is distinc-
tive and famous but the defendant’s conduct does not result in a 
likelihood of confusion.10  Finally, trademark dilution and in-
fringement occur when a distinctive and famous mark is in-
fringed.11 
In those cases where there is dilution but not infringement only 
one of the two fundamental precepts of trademark infringement 
law is present.  Trademark infringement is a tort because two 
 
5. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998); see also Steven M. Cordero, Note, Co-
caine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending the Trademark and Publicity 
Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 599, 604 (1998). 
6. See Prager, supra note 3, at 122 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)). 
7. See Prager, supra note 3, at 123.  The Dilution Act defines “dilution” as the less-
ening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of a famous 
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.  15 
U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998); see also Cordero, supra note 5, at 617 n.101. 
8. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998). 
9. See Prager, supra note 3, at 123. 
10. See id. at 123. 
11. See Appendix, infra p. 527 for illustrative diagram. 
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wrongs are being committed—a wrong to plaintiff for infringement 
of its mark, and a wrong to the public at large, which is being mis-
led by the defendant’s activities.  Dilution without infringement is 
primarily premised upon plaintiff’s property right, since the public 
is not being misled.12  In a pure dilution case, the absence of a pub-
lic interest has caused some courts to view dilution claims unfa-
vorably.13 
The Dilution Act provides that the owner of a “distinctive and 
famous” mark shall be entitled, under principles of equity, to an in-
junction against another’s commercial use of a mark or trade name, 
if such use begins after the mark has become famous, and if it 
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.14  To deter-
mine if a mark is “distinctive and famous” a court may consider 
eight enumerated factors, but the statute states that the list is not 
exclusionary of other factors.  Those eight factors will be discussed 
shortly.15  The Act states that the owner of the famous mark will 
get only injunctive relief—unless the defendant “willfully” in-
tended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution.  
Then, if willfulness is present, damages, lost profits, attorneys fees, 
and increased damages are recoverable, subject to the discretion of 
the court and principles of equity.16  If the defendant has a valid 
federal registration on the principal register, that registration is a 
 
12. See Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (“Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which if al-
lowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.”); Allied 
Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 545 (distinguish-
ing dilution as “[n]ot public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by 
competitors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon 
the business reputation of an established distinctive trade-mark or name”). 
13. See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340 
(1996) (concluding that there is no public interest in granting relief); I.P. Lund Trading v. 
Kohler Co., 11 F. Supp.2d 112 (1998) (noting that preliminary injunction is appropriate 
only with showing of public interest). 
14. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998). 
15. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H); infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.  The origi-
nal version of the anti-dilution bill stated that “[e]ach of the factors set forth in the provi-
sion should be weighed independently and it is the cumulative effect of these considera-
tions which will determine whether a mark qualifies for federal protection from dilution.”  
S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 42 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5604-05; see 
also Cordero, supra note 5, at 618, n.103. 
16. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2) (West 1998). 
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complete bar to an action against that registration under a state 
statute or state common law.17  So there is a degree of preemption 
under the Federal statute.  Certain actions are exempt: fair use for 
comparative advertising or promotion of competing goods or ser-
vices; noncommercial use of a famous trademark; and all forms of 
news reporting and commentary.18  Finally, the statute defines the 
term “dilution.”  “Dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of 
a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of competition between the 
famous mark and others, or a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or 
deception.19 
This Essay revisits the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and  
explores the issues surrounding its application.  Part I discusses 
how courts have dealt with the issue of whether the Act may be 
applicable retroactively.  Part II examines what makes a mark dis-
tinctive and famous under the Act.  Part III reviews dilution under 
the Act.  This Essay concludes that there many uncertainties re-
main regarding the reach and long term impact of the Federal Dilu-
tion Act. 
I. RETROACTIVITY 
The Dilution Act became effective on January 16, 1996.  
Clearly, activities completed before that date are not actionable 
under the statute.20  Yet, for those marks that were adopted and 
used before the effective date of the statute, and remain in use, a 
question arises as to whether that use is properly enjoined.  Thus 
far, a majority of district courts have refused to do so. 
Both the Dilution Act and its legislative history are silent as to 
whether claims under the Act should be applied retroactively.  In 
the absence of clear Congressional intent favoring retroactivity, the 
majority of the courts have followed the rule of the Supreme Court 
 
17. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(3) (West 1998). 
18. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West 1998). 
19. See supra note 7. 
20. See, e.g., Bonechi S.R.L. v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., Ltd., 95 Civ. 4008, 1998 
WL 193246, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1998) (stating that the Dilution Act does not apply 
retroactively to permit recovery of damages for conduct that ceased prior to the effective 
date of the statute). 
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in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,21 which disfavors retroactivity 
and requires examination of whether application of the statute 
would attach new legal consequences to events completed before 
enactment of the statute.  New legal consequences would impair 
rights possessed by a party when he acted, increase a party’s liabil-
ity for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transac-
tions already completed.22 
In the leading district court case to consider retroactive applica-
tion of the Dilution Act, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Officemax, 
Inc.,23 the court found that when a defendant, in the years before 
the Dilution Act came into effect, was justified in selecting its 
marks, investing in advertising, and expanding its business opera-
tions—considerations of fairness required the court to reject a fed-
eral dilution claim for either money damages or injunctive relief.24  
To hold otherwise would cause the owner of the accused mark 
“[to] lose its very identity, achieved as the result of conduct and 
commercial investment, which was perfectly lawful at the time.”25 
Guiding the court’s decision was the reasoning in Landgraf 
that: 
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individu-
als should have an opportunity to know what the law is and 
to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations 
should not be lightly disrupted.  For that reason, the ‘prin-
ciple that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be 
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took 
place has timeless and universal appeal. . . .  In a free and 
dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and artistic 
endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people 
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.26 
 
21. 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). 
22. See id. at 280. 
23. 949 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
24. See id. at 415. 
25. See id. 
26. Id. (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265-66) (emphasis added). 
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Other district courts have followed the holding in Circuit 
City.27  At least one district court, however, has rejected the Circuit 
City holding.  In Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One,28 the court al-
lowed a party to amend its complaint to add a claim for injunctive 
relief under the Dilution Act, even though the accused mark was 
adopted and used before the statute came into effect.  The court in 
Fuente concluded that an injunction is a measure of prospective re-
lief that does not attach new legal consequences to events com-
pleted before enactment of the Dilution Act.29 
The only appellate court to consider this issue has rejected the 
Circuit City holding.  In Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc.,30 
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied, inter alia, on the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Landgraf that an intervening 
statute “may ‘authorize[] . . . prospective relief’ without running 
afoul of the traditional presumption against retroactivity.”31  As 
noted in Viacom, the court in Circuit City dismissed this Supreme 
Court pronouncement as mere dicta.32  Further, as the Viacom 
court recognized, the Dilution Act expressly provides that its in-
junctive relief is “subject to the discretion of the court and the 
principles of equity.”33 
 
27. See, e.g., S Industries, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 
1012 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the absence of express retroactivity language in the 
Federal Dilution Act precludes its application to conduct completed before its enact-
ment); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Dev. Corp., 973 F. Supp. 552 
(M.D.N.C. 1997) (concluding that there is no evidence in the text or legislative history of 
the Dilution Act to support the Act’s application retroactively). 
28. 985 F. Supp. 1448 (M.D. Fla. 1997). 
29. See id. at 1453. 
30. 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998). 
31. Id. at 889 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 297 n.3) (alteration in original). 
32. See Viacom, 141 F.3d at 889. 
33. Id. at 890. 
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II. WHAT MAKES A MARK DISTINCTIVE AND FAMOUS? 
The Dilution Act sets forth eight factors which Courts may 
consider to determine whether a mark is distinctive and famous.34  
These factors include: the degree of inherent or acquired distinct-
iveness of the mark;35 the duration and extent of use of the mark in 
connection with the goods or services with which the mark is 
used;36 the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the 
mark;37 the geographical extent of the trading area in which the 
mark is used;38 the channels of trade for the goods or services with 
which the mark is used;39 the degree of recognition of the mark in 
the trading areas and channels of trade of the mark’s owner and the 
person against whom the injunction is sought;40 the nature and ex-
tent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;41 and 
whether the mark was registered under a prior trademark act or on 
the principal register.42 
Other factors, such as licensing revenue and the price of pur-
chasing a trademark and its associated good will might be consid-
ered.43  However, hearsay, anecdotal, and conclusory statements 
about alleged fame are given little, if any, weight when assessing 
the fame of a mark.44 
 
34. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (West 1998). 
35. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (West 1998). 
36. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(B) (West 1998). 
37. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(C) (West 1998). 
38. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(D) (West 1998). 
39. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(E) (West 1998). 
40. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (West 1998). 
41. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(G) (West 1998). 
42. See id. § 1125(c)(1)(H) (West 1998). 
43. See In re Leslie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117, 127-128 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indi-
cating that the list of factors a court may consider in determining whether a mark is dis-
tinctive and famous is non-exclusive). 
44. See King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 577-
78 (D. Colo. 1997). 
VASSALLO.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:36 PM 
510 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 9:503 
A. Fame in the Eyes of the General Public—Or Fame in 
Plaintiffs’ and/or Defendants’ Channels of Trade? 
Being a major player in a particular market weighs in favor of 
finding a mark to be famous.45  On the other hand, a high degree of 
recognition in a niche market is not enough to render a mark fa-
mous, and some courts at least have suggested that fame among the 
general public is required.46  Yet, the general public may be the 
wrong universe.  Factor F of section 1125(c)(1) calls into question 
the recognition of the allegedly famous mark in just two markets: 
the market in which the allegedly famous mark travels and the 
market in which the accused mark travels.47  Thus, while fame 
among the public at large will always do, fame among a significant 
class might be enough to be entitled to protection under the Act.  
At least one commentator contends that, in view of Factor F, a 
plaintiff’s mark should not be categorized as “famous” unless it is 
known to more than fifty percent of the defendant’s potential cus-
tomers.48 
 
45. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 
1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998). 
46. See Michael Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enters., Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 
1463 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Bongo” may be a distinctive mark in the junior women’s apparel 
market, but it is not a generally famous mark); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, 
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (no evidence that recognition of “Weather 
Guard” spilled over into the general consumer market); King of the Mountain, 968 F. 
Supp. at 578 (“King of the Mountain” is not famous outside of its niche market); Panavi-
sion, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 (“Panavision,” which had some advertisements and promotion 
directed to the public, is famous); Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. 
Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (although “Golden Bear” was found well known to golf-
ers, it was not famous to the general public). 
47. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(F) (West 1998). 
48. 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, § 24:92, at 24-156 to 157 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS]. 
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B. Acquiring Fame Takes Time and the “Buick”/”DuPont” 
Analogy 
Fame is seldom achieved overnight.  Rather than attaining “in-
stant fame,” a mark is much more likely to become famous over an 
extended period of time.49  While one court has opined that 15 
years “has been generally held an insufficient amount of time for a 
mark to become famous,”50 generalities, of course may not apply 
in any one particular case.51 
Distinctiveness and fame are sometimes measured against 
other marks.  Citing to examples of dilution provided by Congress 
(“Dupont shoes,” “Buick aspirin” and “Kodak pianos”), courts 
sometimes consider whether the plaintiff’s mark “rises to the 
level” of a “Buick” or “Kodak.”52  Trademarks such as “Bongo,” 
“Weather Guard,” and “Golden Bear,” it has been held, do not 
equal the fame of “Kodak,” and the like,53 and they have been de-
 
49. See, e.g., WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(“Wawa,” used for almost 90 years, is famous), aff’d, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997); Pirelli 
Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Titan Tire Corp., 4 F. Supp.2d 794, 802 (C.D. Ill. 1998) 
(“Pirelli” and “Armstrong,” registered trademarks for more than 80 years, are famous); 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“Toys ‘R’ 
Us,” used for 36 years, is famous); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 
1998) (“Jews for Jesus,” used for more than 24 years, is famous); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 
216 B.R. 117, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (the “Albert Nipon” family of trademarks, 
used for 15 years, were found to be famous); Teletech Customer Care Management (Cali-
fornia), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Teletech,” 
used for about 15 years is probably famous).  Short-term marks have not been found fa-
mous.  See Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 350 
(D.N.J. 1996) (“We’ll Take Good Care of You”, used for 9 years, was not famous); Ap-
pleseed Found., Inc. v. Appleseed Inst., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 672, 677 (D.D.C. 1997) (“Ap-
pleseed,” used for 3 years, is not famous). 
50. Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (finding that use of mark for only fifteen 
years contradicts the contention that the mark is uniquely famous). 
51. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463.  See, e.g.,  Teletech, 977 F. Supp. at 
1413; Leslie Fay, 216 B.R. at 127. 
52. Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463 (“Bongo” clothing did not rise to the 
level of “Buick” or “Dupont”); Golden Bear Int’l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 
742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (“Golden Bear” does not rise to the level of “Exxon,” “Kodak” 
or “Coca-Cola”); Knaack Mfg. Co. v. Rally Accessories, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 991, 1003 
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (“Weather Guard . . . lacks the widespread fame and celebrity as marks 
such as Coca-Cola, Polaroid, Disney, Kodak or Rolls Royce.”). 
53. See Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463; Golden Bear, 969 F. Supp. at 749; 
Knaack, 955 F. Supp. at 1003;. 
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nied protection under the Act.  At the same time, some courts have 
already held marks to be famous and protectable from dilution 
even though they unquestionably do not have the notoriety of 
“DuPont”, “Buick” or “Kodak.”54 
C. Third Party Usage and the Geographic Extent of the 
Mark’s Trading Area 
It is important to remember that a mark must not only be “fa-
mous,” it must also be “distinctive” to be protected under the Dilu-
tion Act.55  Extensive third party use of the same or similar marks 
is a strong indication that a mark is not distinctive.  Third party use 
of the same or similar mark diminishes its distinctiveness, regard-
less of whether the third party use is found within the same mar-
ket56 and regardless of whether it causes confusion.57 
Although the Dilution Act does not require nationwide fame, 
“fame in only one state militates strongly against meriting protec-
tion from dilution under federal law.”58  The legislative history of 
the act supports this conclusion: “[t]he geographic fame of the 
mark must extend throughout a substantial portion of the U.S..”59  
Yet, in WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, the “WAWA” name for convenience 
stores was found famous even though those stores operated in only 
 
54. See Augusta Nat’l, Inc. v. Sir Christopher Hatton, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846 
(N.D. Ga. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction based on likelihood that “Augusta” golf 
towels infringes and dilutes “Augusta” golf-related goods); Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. 
Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995, 1998 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting preliminary 
injunction based on likelihood that “Pro-Techniques,” “Double P Design,” “Formula 2,” 
and “Formula 2 Ultra” fingernail care products and trade dress infringe and dilute 
“Nailtiques,” “Double N Design” and “Formula 2 Plus” fingernail care products and 
trade dress); Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688, 696 (D. Md. 
1996) (finding that “The Frederick Gazette” newspaper infringes and dilutes plaintiff’s 
18 Maryland newspapers which include “Gazette” in their name). 
55. Note, however, that some commentators contend that as used in the Dilution 
Act, “distinctiveness” is synonymous with fame or, at the very least, distinctiveness is 
redundant.  See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 48, § 24:91, at 24-147 to 148. 
56. See Sports Authority, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 925, 941 
(E.D. Mich. 1997); Star Mkts., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (D. Haw. 
1996) (considering same or similar marks by third parties in any industry). 
57. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 517 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
58. Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1035. 
59. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1034. 
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five states.60 
Geographic considerations, of course, highlight the importance 
of pursuing state dilution claims, where appropriate.  Indeed, Con-
gress recognized that “[s]tate laws could continue to be applied in 
cases involving locally famous or distinctive marks.”61 
D. Surveys Designed to Show that a Mark is Distinctive and 
Famous 
Owners of famous marks have used surveys in their attempts to 
prove that their marks are famous and protectable pursuant to the 
Dilution Act.  The surveys used in three recent cases illustrate dif-
ferent approaches taken in an attempt to show the distinctiveness 
and fame of a word mark, slogan and trade dress. 
1. The Star Markets Survey 
In Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc.,62 plaintiff had a secon-
dary meaning survey conducted to measure the association be-
tween the word “Star” and plaintiff’s grocery stores. 63  The survey 
showed that more than seventy-five percent of the survey respon-
dents in Hawaii associated the word “Star” with plaintiff’s “Star 
Market” supermarket.64  Both parties and the Court agreed that the 
survey proved that “Star” had acquired distinctiveness (also known 
as secondary meaning), but the court did not agree with plaintiff’s 
contention that the high degree of association necessarily equates 
to a high level of distinctiveness.65  Instead, the court faulted the 
survey for not measuring the relative strength of consumers’ asso-
ciation between the plaintiff’s use of the word “Star” and third 
party uses of the same or similar mark.66  Thus, the court found 
that although the mark was distinctive, it had less than a high level 
 
60. See WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
61. Star Markets, 950 F. Supp. at 1034 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030-31). 
62. 950 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996). 
63. See id. at 1033. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
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of distinctiveness.67 
In that same case, plaintiff also had a “recognition” survey 
conducted, in which respondents were asked the names of any gro-
cery stores or supermarkets they could recall.68  Over ninety six 
percent of respondents recalled plaintiff’s mark, “Star Markets.”69  
The results of the survey also showed that “Star Markets” received 
more recognition than “DuPont,” and only slightly less recognition 
than “Kodak” or “Buick.”70  While the survey may have estab-
lished the fame of plaintiff’s mark in Hawaii, even plaintiff did not 
contend that a national survey would yield the same results.71 
2. The Ringling Bros. Survey 
A “recognition” survey in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey 
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development72 
asked respondents to fill in the blank in the following statements: 
“The Greatest _____ On Earth” and “Don’t Leave _____ Without 
It.”73  Once the statements were completed, respondents were 
asked with whom or what they associated the completed statement.  
About forty percent of respondents formed the statement “The 
Greatest Show On Earth” and associated it with the Circus.74  In 
the control, about the same percentage of respondents formed the 
statement “Don’t Leave Home Without It” and associated that 
statement with American Express.75  Since the American Express 
slogan was assumed to be famous, the equal recognition of the two 
slogans was evidence that “The Greatest Show On Earth” is a fa-
mous mark.76 
 
67. See id. at 1034. 
68. See id. at 1035. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. at 1035. 
72. 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
73. See id. at 612. 
74. See id. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 612, 613 n.4. 
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3. The Hershey Survey 
In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc.,77 a claim for dilution of 
trade dress was at issue.  Plaintiff sought to protect only certain 
elements of the packaging of its “Reese’s” peanut butter candy—
namely its combination of orange, brown and yellow—from al-
leged dilution by the packaging of peanut butter “M&M’s.”78  Her-
shey’s expert conducted a secondary meaning and fame survey by 
relabeling the “Reese’s” package as “Brand X” and altering other 
aspects of the trade dress, and then asking respondents to identify 
the brand and their reason for doing so.79  Some ninety four per-
cent of respondents identified the mock-up as “Reese’s” and only 
“Reese’s.”80  Nevertheless, the court considered the color combina-
tion at issue as similar to enough third-party marks in the food in-
dustry that it did not seem worthy of protection as famous, and the 
court declined to enter a preliminary injunction.81 
III. DILUTION 
The Dilution Act defines dilution as “the lessening of the ca-
pacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or ser-
vices, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition be-
tween the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”82 
How dilution occurs, or by what means it may be measured or 
detected is not specified in the Act.  Congress intended the above 
definition “to encompass all forms of dilution recognized by the 
courts, including dilution by blurring, by tarnishment and dispar-
agement, and by diminishment.”83  Blurring and diminishment in-
jure the mark’s selling power by “whittling away” the distinctive-
 
77. 998 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
78. See id. at 502. 
79. See id. at 509-10. 
80. See id. at 511. 
81. See id. at 517. 
82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998). 
83. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting 
H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029); see also Ringling 
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 
204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 
(N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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ness of a mark and the ability of the mark to serve as a unique 
identifier of the source of goods and services.84  Tarnishment and 
disparagement damage the image of the trademark.85  For example, 
they involve the unauthorized use of a trademark with goods of 
poor quality or the unauthorized association of a trademark with a 
disparaging, negative or unwholesome message. 
Dilution can also result from conduct that does not neatly fit 
into the categories of tarnishment and blurring.  For example, in 
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,86 the defendant regis-
tered famous trademarks of others as Internet domain names for 
the purpose of selling the domain name registrations to the trade-
mark owners.  Although the court did not find either tarnishment or 
blurring, it found that the defendant “diminished ‘the capacity of 
the Panavision marks to identify and distinguish Panavision’s 
goods and services on the Internet’ [as a domain name].”87 
A. Dilution by Tarnishment or Disparagement and Dilution by 
Blurring 
Cases that involve dilution by tarnishment or disparagement 
generally are easier for the courts to decide than are those involv-
ing dilution by blurring.  As Justice Stewart has stated in connec-
tion with obscenity and pornography, obscenity may be hard to de-
fine but “he knows it when he sees it.”88  Similarly, courts have 
had little difficulty, for example, in finding that “Adults R Us” in 
an Internet site tarnished and thereby diluted “Toys ‘R’ Us” and 
 
84. See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 48, § 24:68. 
85. See id. § 24:95. 
86. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), aff’g, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
87. Id. at 1326 (quoting Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996)).  CHECK CASE NAME 
88. Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  
Justice Stewart opined: 
I have reached the conclusion, which I think is confirmed at least by negative 
implication in the Court’s decisions since Roth and Alberts, that under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally lim-
ited to hard-core pornography.  I shall not today attempt further to define the 
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand descrip-
tion; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it 
when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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“Kids ‘R’ Us” when used to sell sexual products.89 
To determine whether conduct constitutes dilution by blurring, 
a number of courts follow the six factor test set forth by Judge 
Sweet in Mead Data, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales.90  The factors 
considered are the similarity of the marks, the similarity of the 
products covered by the marks, the sophistication of consumers, 
the predatory intent, the renown of the senior mark, and the re-
nown of the junior mark.91 
Protection under the Dilution Act is not limited to offending 
marks that are identical to the famous mark; marks that are similar 
or imitative may dilute the value of a famous mark.92 
A number of courts have considered five of the above factors, 
without considering predatory intent.93  Indeed, predatory intent is 
not required under section 43(c).  The Dilution Act contemplates 
the issuance of an injunction where dilution is found and an award 
of damages in only those cases where the defendant “willfully in-
tended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution.”94 
 
89. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1836-39 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (granting preliminary injunction).  See also Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 
46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (permanent injunction granted prohibiting 
the tarnishing use of “The Polo Club” and “Polo Executive Retreat” for an adult enter-
tainment establishment). 
90. 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, concurring).  See, e.g., Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 
605, 618 (E.D. Va. 1997) (applying the six factor test); WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (same); American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 947 
F. Supp. 310, 316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same). 
91. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035; Sara Lee Corp. v. American Leather Prods., 
Inc., No. 97-C-4158, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11914, at *31 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1998); Rin-
gling Bros., 955 F. Supp. at 618; WAWA, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1632; American Express Co. 
v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 316-17 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
92. See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 955 F. Supp. at 618 (“For blurring to occur, a junior 
mark must be substantially similar to a senior mark.”); WAWA, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1632 
(finding that “HAHA 24 HR. Market” and “Wawa” are similar in sight, sound, and con-
text). 
93. See, e.g., Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. 
Supp.2d 271, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Johnson Publ’g Co. v. Willitts Designs Int’l, Inc., 
No. 98-C-2653, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9264, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1998); In re Les-
lie Fay Cos., 216 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep 
Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 562 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey 
Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
94. Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 215 n.3 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(2)). 
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Likewise, some courts have stated that similarity of the prod-
ucts should not be considered in an analysis of a federal dilution 
claim,95 in that Congress recognized that dilution may exist 
“whether or not the parties market the same or related goods . . .”96  
Nevertheless, some courts hold that when the products covered by 
the marks are dissimilar, a stronger showing of blurring is required 
than if the products were similar.97 
Renown of the junior user has also been ignored as a factor, or 
considered of marginal relevance, by some courts when the junior 
user is new to the market.98  However, other courts have held that 
where the fame of the junior user’s mark is low or non-existent, it 
is unlikely that the such mark will cause even minimal, if any, dilu-
tion by blurring.99 
Commentators have also weighed in with opinions on which of 
the six Mead factors should be used in a court’s analysis of a fed-
eral dilution claim.  No doubt, more debate on this issue will fol-
low. 100 
B. Surveys Designed to Show Dilution and “Likelihood” of 
Dilution 
In Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc.,101 the plaintiff sought to 
protect elements of the trade dress of its “Reese’s” peanut butter 
candy from alleged dilution by the packaging of peanut butter 
“M&M’s” and relied on a survey to show a likelihood of dilution.  
For the “Hershey,” “M&M’s” and control packages used in the 
 
95. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 519-20 (M.D. Pa. 
1998). 
96. Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029). 
97. See Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 212; American Express Co. v. CFK, Inc., 
947 F. Supp. 310, 317 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, 
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340, 350 (D.N.J. 1996). 
98. See Clinique Labs., 945 F. Supp. at 563; Leslie Fay, 216 B.R. at 133 n.9; Lex-
ington Management, 10 F. Supp.2d at 289. 
99. See Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 214; American Express, 947 F. Supp. at 318. 
100. See, e.g., Hershey, 998 F. Supp. at 504 (citing 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, 
supra note 48, § 24:94.1, at 24-163 to 164) (factors 2, 3, 4 and 6 are not relevant); Prager, 
supra note 3, at 135 n.51 (stating that factors 2, 3, 5 and 6 are not relevant)). 
101. 998 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
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survey, Hershey relabeled the packages as “Brand X” and also al-
tered the packages to selectively retain more design elements for 
some brands and less design elements for others.102  In denying 
Hershey’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court found that 
the unfairly altered “M&M’s” and control packages provided no 
evidence of any alleged dilution caused by the “M&M’s” trade 
dress.103 
In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Division of Travel Development,104 the plaintiff in a dilution 
survey showed that twenty five percent of Utah respondents, com-
pared to forty one percent of respondents nationwide, associated 
the statement “The Greatest _____ on Earth” with Ringling Bros. 
alone.105  In Utah, respondents also heavily associated the incom-
plete statement with the defendant, Utah Division of Travel’s 
(“Utah Travel’s”) slogan “The Greatest Snow on Earth.”106  Out-
side Utah, the Utah Travel slogan is essentially unknown.  The 
court rejected this survey as evidence of dilution because (1) out-
side of Utah the survey provides no evidence of dilution, (2) within 
Utah there was no evidence that persons associate the slogan “The 
Greatest Show On Earth” with Utah Travel, snow or skiing, (3) 
there was no evidence that fewer respondents in Utah associate the 
Ringling Bros. mark with a circus, and (4) the survey provided no 
evidence that the Ringling Bros. slogan no longer “call[s] immedi-
ately to mind” the circus in Utah.107  Clearly, the main defect of the 
survey was that it tested the fill-in-the-blank statement “The Great-
est _____ On Earth,” rather than the famous Ringling Bros. 
mark.108  The high percentage of respondents that associated the 
completed statement, “The Greatest Show on Earth,” with only 
Ringling Bros. also showed the absence of dilution.109 
 
102. See id. at 509-10, 518-19. 
103. See id. at 511. 
104. 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) 
105. See id. at 618. 
106. See id. 
107. Id. at 617 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 
1982)). 
108. See id. at 618. 
109. See id. at 616-618. 
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In WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf,110 twenty nine percent of survey re-
spondents located in the neighborhood of defendant’s market asso-
ciated the “HAHA 24 Hr. Market” with plaintiff’s “Wawa” mar-
ket.111  The court found that this survey was credible and supports 
its own conclusion that “HAHA 24 HR. MARKET” dilutes the 
value of plaintiff’s mark.112 
Clearly, the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a dilution 
case requires a determination of the likelihood of dilution, that is, 
the likelihood of prevailing on the dilution claim at trial.  When 
considering the issuance of a permanent injunction, some courts 
mistakenly based their decision on the “likelihood” of dilution,113 
perhaps because of the “likelihood of confusion” language for in-
fringement in the Lanham Act.114  Where the means for measuring 
and detecting dilution are not always apparent, these mistaken ref-
erences make a proper determination of dilution all the more diffi-
cult. 
C. Media, Parody, and Noncommercial Use Exceptions and 
Protection on the Internet 
The Dilution Act specifically exempts certain uses of a mark as 
not actionable under the statute.115  These exempt uses include the 
“[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing 
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark . . . [the] 
[n]oncommercial use of a mark . . . [and] [a]ll forms of news re-
porting and news commentary.”116 
Non-commercial use of a mark includes constitutionally pro-
tected speech.  Congress intended that parody, satire, editorial and 
 
110. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
111. See id. at 1632. 
112. See id. 
113. See Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 
1998) (basing permanent injunction on “likelihood” of dilution); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 
216 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (basing permanent injunction on “likelihood” 
of dilution); Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1240 (granting summary judgment on the finding 
of “likelihood” of dilution). 
114. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 1998). 
115. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(4) (West 1998). 
116. Id. 
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other forms of expression that are not part of a commercial transac-
tion” should be exempt from the reach of the Dilution Act.117 
The Dilution Act has become a useful tool for resolving Inter-
net trademark disputes, as was intended by Congress.  Frequently 
cited by the courts is Senator Leahy’s statement that he “hope[d] 
that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive 
Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are 
associated with the products and reputations of others.”118 
Dilution has been found where a defendant has used an organi-
zation’s mark as a domain name to make disparaging statements 
about the organization and/or as a platform to advance views con-
trary to the teachings and practices of the organization.  These sites 
are intended to intercept, through the use of deceit and trickery, the 
audience sought by the legitimate organization.  Such conduct 
amounts to dilution by tarnishment or blurring.119 
Even the danger of potential tarnishment has been cited as a 
basis for finding dilution.  In Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,120 the de-
fendant used plaintiff’s mark in his Internet site domain name, 
even though the site contained nothing more than a map and con-
 
117. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1574 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch)), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).  The Cat Not in the Hat!  A 
Parody by Dr. Juice, a book about the O.J. Simpson murder trial which mimics the dis-
tinctive style of the Dr. Seuss works, was held to be an expressive use exempt from the 
reach of the Dilution Act. See id.; see also Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records Inc., 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1407, 1419-20 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (denying motion for preliminary injunction 
absent stronger evidence that “Barbie Girl” song and video parody actually tarnishes the 
image of Mattel’s “Barbie” doll). 
118. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy)); see also, Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech 
Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 
1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
119. See, e.g., Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998) (issuing a 
preliminarily injunction against the defendant from using the name of the plaintiff or-
ganization, Jews for Jesus, as a domain name).  Other examples of tarnishment on the 
Internet include the use of the name “Adults R Us” in an Internet site in association with 
sexual products that are inconsistent with the “Toys ‘R’ Us” image, see Toys “R” Us, Inc. 
v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996), and the use of the domain name 
“candyland.com” in association with sexually explicit material, see Hasbro, Inc. v. Inter-
net Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996). 
120. 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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tained no information about the plaintiff’s products.121  As ex-
plained by the court, “if [defendant] were allowed to use ‘inter-
matic.com,’ Intermatic’s name and reputation would be at [defen-
dant’s] mercy and could be associated with an unimaginable 
amount of messages on [defendant’s] web page . . . . Attaching In-
termatic’s name to a myriad of possible messages . . . is something 
that the [Lanham] Act does not permit.”122 
Dilution has occurred on the Internet, not only through the use 
of a famous trademark as a domain name, but also through meta-
tags.  Metatags are the machine readable codes found in Internet 
web pages that can be used by individuals or search engines to ac-
cess a trademark owner’s web site by searching for the trademark.  
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label,123 the unau-
thorized use of the trademarks “Playboy” and “Playmate,” as part 
of a domain name and metatag, was preliminarily enjoined.  How-
ever, when a defendant makes fair use of a famous mark, either in 
a website or in metatags, there is no dilution.124 
D. The “Commercial Use in Commerce” Requirement 
The Dilution Act protects owners of famous marks from “an-
other person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade 
name, if such use . . . causes dilution . . .”125  Both “commercial 
use” and “in commerce,” two distinct requirements, must be estab-
lished to succeed on a federal dilution claim. 
The “in commerce” requirement is a jurisdictional predicate to 
many federal laws.  For example, the Lanham Act claims for in-
fringement, false designation of origin, and false descriptions also 
have an “in commerce” requirement.126  Although the Lanham 
Act’s definition of “in commerce” may appear, at first glance, to 
 
121. See id. at 1232. 
122. Id. at 1239-40. 
123. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
124. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1186, 1192 (S.D. Cal. 
1998) (denying preliminary injunction where the defendant used the trademarks “Play-
mate” and “Playmate of the Year” in her website and metatags to identify herself because 
it constituted fair use). 
125. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998) (emphasis added). 
126. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (West 1998). 
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be a narrow one,127 the scope of “in commerce” has been given a 
broad and sweeping interpretation by the courts. 
For example, in Planned Parenthood Federation v. Bucci,128 
the court found that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s service mark in 
his Internet domain name “plannedparenthood.com” and web site 
satisfied the “use in commerce” requirement for two reasons.129  
First, the defendant used the Internet and his actions had an effect 
on the plaintiff’s interstate commerce activities.  Second, Internet 
users must use interstate telephone lines to access defendant’s web 
site.130 
In the same case, the “commercial use” requirement, however, 
was met for three reasons:  (1) defendant promoted a third party’s 
book on his web site;  (2) defendant was a non-profit political ac-
tivist who solicited funds for his activities (although he did not di-
rectly solicit funds on his web site); and (3) defendant’s actions 
were designed to, and did, harm the plaintiff commercially.131  The 
 
127. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998).  The statute provides that: 
The term ‘use in commerce’ means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.  For purposes 
of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce- 
(1) on goods when- 
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the dis-
plays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the 
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on docu-
ments associated with the goods or their sale, and 
(B)the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and 
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services 
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered more 
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person ren-
dering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services. 
Id. 
128. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
129. See id. at 1434. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 1435.  See also Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 
1998) (dicta that “commercial use” was present for three reasons: (1) where there are in-
direct sales on the Internet, via the use of a hyperlink to a separate organization which 
sells merchandise; (2) by “disparaging the plaintiff organization and preventing [it] from 
exploiting [its own m]ark”; and (3) by inhibiting the efforts of Internet users to locate the 
trademark/service mark owner’s Internet site); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 
F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (trading on the value of plaintiff’s trademark by register-
ing it as a domain name and attempting to sell the domain name to the plaintiff consti-
tutes commercial use.); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 
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court’s recognition of the effect of the defendant’s actions on the 
plaintiff’s commercial use and use in commerce illustrates the ex-
pansive interpretation of the “commercial use”/”in commerce” re-
quirements.132 
The cases against Network Solutions Inc. (“NSI”) in Academy 
of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Network Solutions Inc.,133 
also highlight the importance of the “commercial use” and “in 
commerce” requirements.134  NSI is a private company which per-
forms the function of registering Internet domain names.135  The 
district court denied a motion for preliminary injunction against 
NSI where there was no likelihood that the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences, holder of the registered trademarks 
“Academy Awards” and “Oscars,” would succeed in demonstrat-
ing that domain names themselves are goods or services, the sale 
of which may cause dilution.136  The court held that the mere regis-
tration of a domain name does not constitute “commercial use” or 
use “in commerce.”137  That is because the registration of a domain 
name, without more, does not constitute use of the name as a 
trademark.138  NSI’s limited action, mere registration, did not in-
volve the sale or offer for sale of goods or services.139 
E. Other Considerations When Pursuing, or Defending 
Against, a Federal Dilution Claim 
Section 1125(c)(1) of title 15 provides that “the owner of a fa-
mous mark” shall be entitled to an injunction where another per-
son’s use of a mark causes dilution.140  An exclusive licensee of a 
 
1996) (finding of “commercial use” based on intention to arbitrage the registered domain 
name; “in commerce” requirement met by use of the Internet which transmits communi-
cations worldwide). 
132. See Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239-40. 
133. 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
134. See id. at 1279. 
135. See id. at 1277. 
136. See id. at 1281. 
137. See id. at 1278-79. 
138. See id. at 1280. 
139. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-
960 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (basing summary judgment on dilution claim in favor of NSI on the 
conclusion that NSI does not make “commercial use” of domain names as trademarks). 
140. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998). 
VASSALLO.NEW.TYP.DOC 9/29/2006  4:36 PM 
1999] THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT REVISITED 525 
mark is not an “owner” and does not have standing to seek injunc-
tive relief for its federal dilution claim.141Contributory dilution is a 
new theory of liability, and no cases were found in which a party 
succeeded with this claim.  In the few cases mentioning contribu-
tory dilution, there has been no meaningful discussion of such 
claim.142  Due to the essentially equitable nature of the provisions 
of the Dilution Act, at least one court has held the parties in that 
case were not entitled to a jury trial.143 
One goal of the Dilution Act was to prevent the forum shop-
ping that resulted from the limited number of states with anti-
dilution statutes.144  Certainly, in those states where there was no 
state dilution law the federal statute has filled in the gaps by mak-
ing a federal dilution claim available.  The federal dilution statute, 
however, does not preempt state dilution law with one minor ex-
ception.145  Thus, to the extent state dilution law is more favorable 
than the federal law, forum shopping may still appeal to the owner 
of a famous mark.  A frivolous claim under the Dilution Act may 
result in an award of attorneys fees to the defendant.  Attorneys 
 
141. See STX, Inc. v. Bauer USA, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1492, 1495-96 (N.D. Cal. 
1997). 
142. See Academy, 989 F. Supp. at 1279 (the plaintiff’s failure to cite any case law 
or statutory basis for its claim of contributory dilution weighed strongly against the issu-
ance of a preliminary injunction on this claim); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 640, 645-646 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (denying plaintiff’s motion to 
amend the complaint to add a claim for contributory dilution in view of the tenuous na-
ture of the claim and the plaintiff’s undue delay); Kegan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment on the claim of contributory dilution because of the existence of genuine issues 
of material fact). 
143. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 598, 600 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
144. See Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Win-
dows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 141 CONG. REC. H14317-01, 
H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead)); American Express Co. 
v. CFK, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
145. See Kegan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1053, 1061 (N.D. Ill. 
1996); Ringling Bros., 937 F. Supp. at 208 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (“the Act was not intended to ‘pre-empt ex-
isting state dilution statutes . . .  [A] federal dilution statute should . . . co-exist with state 
dilution law.’”)); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996).  
However, the Act does bar a state dilution claim against a federally registered mark.  See 
supra Part I. 
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fees were awarded in a case where the plaintiff failed to allege that 
the mark was famous and supplied no evidence to show that the 
mark was famous.146 
CONCLUSION 
There remain many uncertainties about the reach and long term 
impact of the Federal Dilution Act.  It will be interesting to see 
whether the appellate courts will apply the statute to marks not as 
notorious as “Buick” or “Kodak”; whether they too, like the Her-
shey court, will reject attempts by plaintiffs to argue that portions 
of a defendants’ trade dress dilutes their own trade dress; and to 
what extent the Mead factors are deemed relevant to a determina-
tion of dilution by blurring. 
 
146. See S Industries, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F. Supp. 1012, 
1024 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
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APPENDIX 
PRINCIPLES OF TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND TRADEMARK 
DILUTION:  AN ILLUSTRATION. 
Principles of Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, 
and their convergence may be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A—Dilution:  “Famous and Distinctive” marks diluted but not 
infringed because of the absence of likelihood of confusion. 
B—Infringement:  Marks infringed because of likelihood of 
confusion, but marks are not diluted because they are not “Famous 
and Distinctive.” 
C—Infringement and Dilution:  Dilution of “Famous and Dis-
tinctive” marks and infringement because of likelihood of confu-
sion. 
 
A C B
